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IN REGULATORY TIMES
Fenglong Xiao
Abstract: Regulatory policy is a considerable factor in organizational business strategy
decisions. This article puts focus on the evaluation of the regulatory policy from the
perspective of the organizational cost under uncertainty. In this paper I examine the
organizational cost of policy transition in different scenarios, and consider, further, what
the impact on the macroeconomic and business policy would be. Three conclusions are
reached: 1. The cost of strategy adoption of organizations under regulation in a monopolized
industry is only affected by their own risk tolerance of uncertainty and the cost of information;
2. when the regulation is enacted in a more competitive market, the cost of information
would raise with a higher expected loss comparing with the same regulation in monopolized
market; 3. If the claim of such measurement is true, the net benefit or loss of regulation is
exactly the difference between organizational information cost and regulatory benefit. So
the policy that guarantees the positive communication and transparent information exchange
that helps to reduce the organizational information cost is necessary for an efficient regulatory
policy.
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The world economy is stepping in regulatory times. A considerable number of
articles have technically analyzed and summarized the failure of regulation on
organization and the global economic downturn (Weber 2010; Levine 2010; Love
and Zaidi 2010; Martin and Ventura 2011; etc.). Here I would rather to provide a
fresh view of the interaction between organization strategy and regulation.
Donaldson (2000) has pointed out the good economic environment should include
fair distribution, open government, social cooperation, and inculcation of economic
duties. Moreover, these ethic factors-and other factors from which no actor inside
the nation can be excluded-can be further categorized to a common but rich concept:
Public Wealth (Enderle 2009), including “public goods natural resources in a country,
basic security, an effectively functioning rule of law, a relatively corruption-free
business environment, a business supportive culture, a decent level of education
and health care of the citizens, etc.” (Enderle 2010). On the other side, the individual
and organizational activities in private sector, or “Private Wealth”, are generally
based on the principle of utility or profit maximization, as the basic presumption in
economics. In most of cases, the economic agents in private sector can affect, and
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also respond to the changes of public environment. Thus the regulation will not
only regulate public economic environment, but also significantly influence the
strategies of organizations and individuals.
In this article, I would like to examine the optimal strategies of organization
under uncertainty, and then derive the efficient regulation requirement by observing
these optimal strategies based on organizational rationality. However, I wish not
to judge the truth with sophisticated econometric approach, because it is hard to
quantify the outcome of the uncertainty (although sometimes I use willingness of
payment of premium to describe the level of uncertainty or risk aversion, it still
cannot serve as a formal norm), and even the quantitative analysis based on the
most accurate data cannot completely explain every aspect of reality. Thus here I
only provide an alternative of view towards the impact of uncertainty in regulation.
I refer the word “Regulation” as the meaning of “Public Regulation”, which is
not only restricted to the regulation on a single industry, but also on the security,
income distribution, transportation, public utilities, environment and energy, health
care, and other sectors (Fromm 1981). We can easily find that these fields of public
regulation aims at are mostly public welfare, which cannot be improved through
pure self-interest market competition. However, can regulation cure all economic
problems without any unanticipated consequences?
In order to illustrate the ambiguous impact of public regulation with uncertainty,
I shall point out three typical and critical areas that public regulation often focuses
on, and we can discuss them in following pages:
Security;
Redistribution;
Natural Resource.
SECURITY
One important goal of public regulation aims at is the security, a typical public
good that preventing or reducing risk of harm to life and property. The analysis
literatures on security have ranged from national legislation of public safety to
international political economy (Kirshner 1995).
Regulation on security can also cause uncertainty in economy. The most obvious
outcome is that firms have to face raising legal obligations. The most recent case is
the European Union Advance Cargo Declaration Regime, which has gone into force
since January 1, 2011. According to the regulation, shipping companies transporting
goods to or from the European Union must submit specific cargo information with
well-prescribed timelines to the relevant customs administrations of European
Union Member States, and no common grace period can be warranted to non-
compliant economic operators, which has provoked wide complaints of extra
administrative and shipping time.
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And those regular security regulations, such as national defense and police
system, also impose costs on economy. The high budget for security regulation
may crowd out other economic investments. Security regulations imply shifting
economic resources between actors, including between sellers and buyers and
between private and public agents. The existence of such a burden will reduce the
efficiency of the market and hence growth. (Brück 2005).
The regulation on security can be discussed respectively in monopolistic market
and more competitive market.
The outcome of regulation in monopolistic market is straightforward. In the case
of shipping safety inspection, that monopolistic shipping company does not only
have to pay specific label printing expense and protracted inspection time as fixed
cost, but also the extra concern of the probability of insecurity or accident ε(θ), which
θ is the risk tolerance of company. Intuitively, the higher θ would cause a lower ε.
The expected probability of accident is p, thus the revised expected probability of
accident is p + ε. The expected revenue of this shipping work is w, expected loss
resulting from the accident is σ. So the payoff of the shipping without accident is V
(w), andV (w–σ) with accident. Now the expected value of this shipping business is:
E(V1) = (1–p–ε) V (w) + (p + ε) V (w–σ)
If the company wants to cover the expected loss of accident by fair insurance
(suppose the insurance market is always perfect competitive that provides fair
insurance, and the slight unfair insurance will be mentioned in a more competitive
case) with the price q and indemnity x, to make the value of this trip equal to:
E(V2) = (1–p–ε) V (w–qx) + (p + ε) V (w –σ –qx+x)
Suppose parameters p, w, σ, q, x stay constant as the given market condition.
Then loss value σ = x, premium qx = (p+ε)σ is the equilibrium1; and for most risk
aversion function ofV(.), E(V2) ≥ E(V1). So the company will prefer the better payofffrom insurance.
The case in a more competitive market seems more complicated. Now assume
there are more shipping companies than monopolistic market but still less than
perfect competitive market. This market structure allows the insurance companies
to change the insurance price for difference shipping company by observing the
revised expected probability of shipping accident, rather than keeping a constant
insurance price in monopolistic shipping market. Now suppose there are two
shipping companies with difference risk tolerance: the higher tolerance θ1 and thelower tolerance θ2, so ε(θ1) ≤ ε(θ2) according to the notation in the monopolisticmarket. Thus the insurance company gives a standard price q for the for company
θ1, and a discriminated price δ for company θ2, because insurance company generallyis reluctant to insure a company with higher revised expected probability of accident.
Assume that θ1= θ in monopolistic market. So the payoffs of two shipping companieswithout insurance are:
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E(V3) = (1–p–ε(θ1)) V(w) + (p + ε(θ1)) V (w–σ)
And the payoffs with insurance are:
E(V5) = (1–p–ε(θ1)) V (w–qx) + (p+ε(θ1)) V (w–σ–qx+x)
E(V6) = (1–p–ε(θ2)) V (w–δx) + (p + ε(θ2)) V (w–σ–δx+x)
In both monopolistic and competitive markets, shipping companies have to
pay the fixed cost of specific label printing expense and protracted inspection time;
but in the competitive market, the average premium to cover uncertainty is
σ[(p+ε(θ1)) + (p+ε(θ2))]/2, which is higher than the premium in monopolistic market
σ[(p+ε(θ1)) when θ1= θ. We can conclude that the regulatory policy in a monopolisticmarket produces less cost than more competitive market to cover the uncertainty.
REDISTRIBUTION
The regulation on income, wealth, and redistribution is another field that
regulatory policy often focus, to improve the public wellbeing. However,
regulatory redistribution also creates uncertainty in the rate of discount of the
future income stream (Lermer and Stanbury 1985). That is, Individual increased
wealth that benefit from regulation would be lower in the absence of regulation,
and the expected value of future return of earnings originally based on the market
price (interest rate, inflation rate, etc.) has distorted by the non-sustainable
regulatory redistribution rule with the risk of variance or volatility of regulation
policy.
Thus governments do not directly regulating the income distribution, but dictate
organizations (firms) to balance the income gap. However, there is also uncertainty
in implementing such redistribution rule in organization, because the redistribution
rule is set by the head of the organization, and she has no incentive to reduce her
profit by processing such redistribution policy. So the employee in organizations
prefers relational contract to constrain the decision of organizations and to cover
the uncertainty of losing deserved support. Now set the payoff of employee is s+b–
C(a), which a is the effort of employees in work which influences the revenue of
organization y (to simplify, set y = a), C(a) is the cost of employee to exert effort in
work, s is the original salary of employee, and b is the compensatory income to
balance income gap. So s + b can be regarded as the total revenue and C(a) can be
regarded as the total cost of the employee. However, the uncertainty is that the
organization has probability (1–α) to refuse to provide compensatory income (just
set b = 0). Now the equilibrium (a, b) = (C’(a), a*(b))2. And the payoff of employee
becomes s+a*(b)*b–C(a), the payoff of the organization is pi = y–s–a*(b)*b, So the
employee will pay a grim trigger strategy, that is,
1. The employee picks a*(b) At the first time;
2. If the organization provides b > 0 as the redistribution rule requires,
employee will still exert a*(b) At the next time;
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3. If ever the organization only offers s without b (refusing to obey the
redistribution rule), the employee will always set a = 0 (to simplify, set the
opportunity cost of staying in the organization is 0).
Now the organization will pay the positive b only if (y–s–b)+pi*p/(1–p)≥(y–s)3
p is the discount rate of the future revenue that can measure the expectation of the
organization to the economic condition, which is based on the information of
economic signals. Intuitively, when p is high, the head of organization has confidence
in economy and is willing to pay compensatory income to support the development
of employee; but the low p represents that the head of organization feels the
economic prospect is dismal, and then she will not want to reduce the profit.
To sum up, although the optimal redistribution rate b is endogenous, whether
this redistribution rule can be implemented depends on the expectation index p,
which is decided by the collected information about economic condition. If such
information reflects prosperity of economy, the organization will set the optimal
redistribution rate of guarantee the fair welfare of employee and high profit of
organization at the same time, whereas the organization will defect the redistribution
rule if the report says the economic environment is unfavorable.
NATURAL RESOURCE
The industry related to natural resource has more properties of monopoly than job
market we have discussed in the last section, since the ownership of natural resource
itself can produce strong market power. This paper will not undertake benefit-cost
analysis to verify whether such regulation has positive or negative outcome as
many professional issues do, but just to depict how the regulation adds uncertainty
to organization strategies in regulatory economy.
Now we can assume that the regulation aims at the abatement of pollution of
an oil company, which has to purchase equipment to reduce pollution. The payoff
in the first stage is R–F, which R is the profit without special cost and F Is the
special fixed cost of the equipment; and the payoff in rest stages are R–m, m is the
special cost of maintenance of the equipment. Set p as the discount rate of the future
revenue, which can also reflect the expectation of future economic prospect, just as
we did in last section. So the expected total payoff of the firm in whole regulation
duration is
pi1 = (R–F) + p(R–m)/(1–p)
The firm also has an option to disobey the regulation policy and gets payoff of
R. But there is a probability δ that such behavior may be denounced to government
at t stage, which is based on the ability of the regulator or the degree of supervision,
and the firm will be fined and enforced to buy the pollution control equipment and
the total loss is the fine plus price of equipment, f + F = U. And then the payoff of
the firm is R–m, U>F>m. Now the expected total payoff is
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pi2=(1–δ)*R/(1–p)+δ*[R(1–pt)/(1–p)+(R–U)*pt + (R–m)pt+1/(1–p)]
The comparison between pi1 and pi2 makes no sense for those big incumbents inthis industry, because they are never willing to risk their long-year reputation and
friendship with government, but significantly influences the decision of those
obscure and small enterprises in such regulatory industry.
Another important player in such market structure is the entrant who wants to
entry this regulatory industry. For entrant, the payoff function becomes less
complicated because the entrant must purchase the equipment to meet the
requirement of entering under regulation:
pi3 = (R1–F) + p1(R1–m)/(1–p1)
And if this potential entrant enters another industry, the payoff is
pi4 = R0/(1–p0)
WhereR1 is the profit without special cost of equipment the entrant can get when itenters in the environment-related industry, andR0 is the profit in other non-regulatedindustries. Here p0= p1= p because p is only the discount rate of future no matter inwhich industry. It is obvious now that the entrant will enter the regulatory industry
if p > (R0 – R1 + F)/(F–m), otherwise it should enter other industries.
So the regulation on natural resource and environment not only impacts some
incumbents in the industry, but also greatly influences the decision of entrants.
There is an uncertainty in such long –run regulation besides discount rate p is the
technology, which may change the price or equipment F and maintenance cost m.
The impact of F is ambiguous because it exists on both numerator and denominator;
but the impact of m is definite, which can be regarded as the mandatory rent if an
organization wishes to sustain the business in this industry.
This result also provides policy insight here. From the result, such environment
regulation may be not so efficient in blooming economy if the parameters stay
constant, since the expectation p would be very high and every enterprise with p >
(R0–R1+F)/(F–m) will want to enter the environment-related industry, which maylead to heavier pollution. So the regulator should set higherm or add tax on using
the equipment every stage to raisem in prosperity times; and should set lowerm or
offer subsidy in every stage to reducem when the regulator doesn’t want to dampen
this industry too much.
In conclusion, this paper sweeps the security, redistribution, and natural resource
as the critical fields of regulation. The analysis focuses on the decision making of
organization under uncertainty in different content of regulation, by means of
insurance, relational contract and game theory to indirectly measure the impact of
uncertainty.
In security field, there are two dissimilar effects in monopolistic industry and
more competitive industry. In the former one, company has to pay the fixed cost
and the premium (p+ε)σ to cover the uncertainty of regulation; and in the later one,
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the average cost of uncertainty is higher than the one in monopolistic industry.
However, in both cases, the cost of organization is decided by their own risk
tolerance parameters;
In redistribution field, the regulation requires organizations to implement the
income redistribution according to established redistribution rule. However, the
incentive condition pi > b*(1–p])/p of organization to under regulation is primarily
based on the uncertain discount rate p, which further depends on the collected
information of the economic condition, whereas the optimal level of redistribution
rate b is endogenous in organization;
In natural environment field, the regulation has little effect on those
famous and big companies because the reputation and relationship with
governments are more important than the cost of uncertainty, whereas some obscure
and small enterprise may have better off from deviating from regulation. And the
decision of entrants is also greatly influenced by the estimation of discount rate p
and the technology rentm, which are both uncertain in long run regulatory times.
Having said these, the value of information is obvious. The costs of organization
to overcome the uncertainty in models are all based on the information the
organization can get, and the accurate information does not only influence the
organization strategies, but also help regulators to estimate the proper level of
regulation from the information of cost of organization. The Sixth Annual MIT
Sloan Investment Management Conference asked what we should expect in the
uncertain and regulatory economy, and this paper is seeking the answer. That is,
the symmetric information can reduce the extra cost of uncertainty in regulation,
which calls for, at least, the transparent disclosure and positive communication
between the government and organization.
Notes
1. In perfect competitive market of insurance, expected profit E(pi) = 0, and E(pi) = (q–p–ε)x
∴ q = p+ε E(V2) = (1–p–pi) V(w–qx) + (p + ε) V(w–σ–qx+x)
Or E(V2) = (1–p–ε) V(w–(p+ε)x) + (p+ε)V(w–σ–(p+ε)x+x)
First order condition:
dE(V2)/dx = (p+ε) (1–p–ε) V′(w–(p+ε)x)+(p+ε) V′(w–σ–(p+ε)x+x) (1–(p+ε)) = 0
w–(p+ε)x = w–σ–(p+ε)x+x
σ = x
qx = (p+ε)x = (p+ε)σ
2. Max s + ab – C(a)
First order condition:
b = C′(a), a = a*(b)
3. The payoff of the organization in whole regulation time is
(y–s–b) + pip + pip2 + pip3 + ... + pipn = (y–s–b) + pi*p/(1–p), which must be larger than (y–s) + 0+02 +
03 + ... + 0n = y–s, if the head of organization has incentive to sustain such relationship and profit
gaining.
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